Now you can rest easy

If you were an Indians fan in 1960, then you, too, have been tortured for years by Kuenn-for-Colavito. WHY? You ask. How could Frank "Trader" Lane justify it? And why exactly was the trade such a miserable failure?

Thanks to Bill James, author and founder of sabermetrics, I believe I can explain it to you.

Lane defended the trade by saying that a premier singles hitter like Kuenn was more valuable than the slugging Rocco, largely because he was what Cleveland needed in 1960 to push the Tribe into first place. Fans before and since have always preferred and revered sluggers over singles hitters, so of course his argument was dismissed.

In fact, in terms of James' runs created formula, which very closely approximates the number of runs a player's offensive actions produce for his team, sluggers and singles hitters are often quite close. So it was with Kuenn and Colavito. Kuenn over his career created 1,013 runs, using 5,116 outs to do so. The Rock created 1,159 runs with fewer outs (5,058). But over a 14-year career, the difference is not as impressive as I assumed it would be. Both were damn good offensive players. (And slow as molasses on the base paths.)

The problem with Kuenn-for-Colavito was not that Kuenn was no match offensively for The Rock. He just wasn't what Cleveland needed in 1960. Lane had already made the deal Cleveland needed in 1958, when he sent Roger Maris to KC for Vic Power and Woodie Held. As much fun as it would have been to have had Colavito and Maris on the same team, they were essentially the same offensive player. (Maris was a better fielder and runner.) They both drew a lot of walks and didn't strike out too much, so they were both getting on base AND moving runners around. Particularly the latter.

So Lane made the right move in 1958. He had his slugger and needed someone who got on base. He brought on Vic Power, the slick-fielding first sacker and a master at getting on base and scoring runs--just what The Rock needed in front of him. Power and Held rebuilt an aging, poor-hitting infield, Held even adding some HR pop. Had Lane merely stuck with that team, and waited for his young pitchers to mature, the Tribe would have contended throughout the 1960s. No doubt about it.

There were two flies in the ointment: Tito Francona and Lane's ego. Francona had a career year in 1959, hitting .363 with 20HRs. Lane mistook him for the next Stan Musial. Since Tito hit 20 in only 399 ABs in 1959, Lane probably figured he'd hit 30 as a regular. Who needed Colavito? Unfortunately, Tito came back to earth in 1960, and for the rest of his career proved beyond a doubt that 1959 was a fluke.

Then there was Lane's ego. The fans already hated him for threatening to move the team. Like a spoiled child, he could get even by trading our idol, the Rock, and rubbing it in when Francona and Kuenn teamed up to bring Lane a pennant. Didn't quite work out that way, though.

To make matters worse, Lane compounded his mistake in 1960 by stupidly trading Minnie Minoso for Bubba Phillips. Minoso had two great years left in him; Phillips never had any great years. Sure, Cleveland needed a third sacker. But Lane already had one on the team, the same Vic Power who made the Kuenn-Colavito trade redundant. Lane would have been better off putting Tito at 1B and Power at 3B, where he had played earlier in his career. With Held at short and his already balanced outfield of Piersall, The Rock and Minnie, he could have stood pat for a few more winning years. But they didn't call him "Trader" Lane for nuttin.

In retrospect, Lane had the right idea. Teams need sluggers and guys who get on base. One is only more valuable than another if he is what the team requires to be successful. What Cleveland required in 1960 was patience. By 1964, the pitching staff would include youngsters Siebert, McDowell and Tiant, along with Kralick and Bell. Baltimore was contending by 1961 with good young pitching supported by a lineup that would have paled before one with Colavito, Held, Francona, Power, Minoso, Romano and Piersall.

Lane's mistake was to make the same trade twice. In 1958, it was the right trade. It put Cleveland into contention again. In 1960, it wrecked the franchise. The frustrating search for Colavito's replacement (as in Kirkland and Wagner) would come up empty for years.