Brock for Broglio revisited

Over the years, the Chicago Cubs have been roundly criticized for their 1964 trade of future HOF outfielder Lou Brock for Ernie Broglio. In fact, the trade has gone down as one of the worst trades in baseball history. And of course Cubs fans, who feel sorry for themselves when they go to bed at night, feel sorry for themselves when they rise in the morning, feel sorry for themselves when they drink beer at the neighborhood tavern, feel sorry for themselves in the shower (deservedly so) and feel sorry for themselves during Mass when they should be feeling sorry for the guy on the cross--Cubs fans moan and weep about that franchise-shattering trade.

You'd almost think it was as bad as Colavito for Kuenn. I always feel sorry for myself when I think of that trade. But in fact, the trade was 100% rational at the time (unlike Kuenn for Colavito), and I would argue that it was not a franchise breaker at all.

This from a guy who has long considered Brock-for-Broglio one of the worst trades ever. But I have been forced to reconsider my position.

The trade did turn the St. Louis Cardinals into a juggernaut. Brock was exactly what St. Louis needed. They didn't need pitching, jeeeee-zus did they have pitching in the '60s. Gibson, Simmons and Sadecki were all having killer years in 1964 when the Cards slipped Broglio to the Cubs. The Cards also had excellent relief pitching during this period from the likes of McDaniel (through '62, then traded to the Cubs) and Hoerner. Once the Cubs dealt McDaniel in '65 for Bill Hands and Randy Hundley, they weren't able to find a suitable replacement, another factor in the failure to grab a flag in those days.

(Note: The McDaniel trade thread is a fascinating one, which I'll pursue when I review the Cardinals' successful post-Musial rebuilding strategy. Suffice to say the Cards made it work to their advantage after apparently being one-upped by the Cubs.)

When they traded Broglio, the Cards assumed they were making an up-and-up deal. He'd gotten off to a bad start, but who knew it was the beginning of the end? They perhaps suspected they were giving the Cubs the missing piece to their pennant puzzle, but were willing to bet the Cubs wouldn't pull it off.

The Cards must have figured with Brock's speed on the bases and in the outfield, he would create, with Curt Flood, one of the fastest outfield combos ever to play the game. They could not have dreamed he would become one of the game's finest hitters. That was the bonus that neither team counted on. Least of all the Cubs, who had decided Brock was a mediocre hitter.

The Cubs, too, had pitching that year. Larry Jackson, Dick Ellsworth and Bob Buhl were wind-em-up-and-send-em-out hurlers, just like Gibson, Simmons and Sadecki. But while the Cards gambled that they could get by with a Big 3 plus relief pitchers, the Cubs were going for Four of a Kind. Had Broglio returned to his 1963 form of 18 wins, they would have been in the thick of the race. The Cards took it with 93 wins; with 18 wins from Broglio instead of 4, the Cubs have a 90+ season.

Didn't work out that way. But you just can't blame the Brock/Bloglio swap for the Cubs' failure to win a pennant. The team's problems went deeper than that.

During the period of Glenn Beckert's career with the Cubs (1965-73), when the Tribe was finishing 5th and 6th and never higher than 3rd place, the Cubs were in it practically every year. Once Durocher took over, they were 3-3-2-2-3-2 from '67-72. They had five Untouchables in the field: Banks, Williams, Beckert, Kessinger and Santo. (For some reason Gentleman Jim Hickman was a mainstay on that team from '68-'73.) All these excellent ballplayers had lifetime job security with the Cubs, a luxury in those days. A great infield, yes--but a sketchy outfield, with Williams surrounded by a shifting cast of ... well, not Lou Brocks. And no relief pitching for most of that period. The catching was pretty decent. Once Hundley took over in '66, he gave them stability there (except for two disastrous years when he was injured and the lack of depth at catcher became painfully clear.) Again, the Cubs' inability to identify a solid #2 catcher during the 1965-73 period was another sign of the organization's poor talent sense. This team had a serious lack of depth behind the Untouchables.

The Cubs could have dealt one of their marquee players (Banks, Williams or Santo), who doubtless would have netted a couple of fine pitchers. They refused to do so. The team's failure to produce one more outstanding outfielder and one or two more top pitchers did more to hold them back than Brock/Broglio. Oh, they came up with some fine pitchers during that period: Jenkins, Hands, Reuschel, Niekro, Nye, Holtzman--but they either gave up on them too soon or they suffered career-ending injuries.

But by 1968, Brock/Broglio was not a major factor. Yes, they could have used Brock in the outfield, no shit! But that '68 team was stoked. Great starting pitching, Phil "The Vulture" Reagan snagging 25 saves out of the pen. Hundley behind the plate. Excellent hitting off the bench, career years at the plate by Billy Williams and Beckert. What killed their chances in '68 were the off seasons by those Chicago icons, Banks and Santo. Don't blame Brock/Broglio.

Sorry, but the truth must be told. The Cubs hung on to Ernie and Ronnie too long. St. Louis loved Ken Boyer. But when he had an off year at age 34, it was bye-bye Kenny. (They got Al Jackson, who had 2 good seasons for the Cards, and Charley Smith, who was traded the next year for Roger Maris, who helped bring 2 pennants to St. Louis before he retired. Boyer was done in two years. Another great Cards' trading thread.) You couldn't trade Stan the Man inSt. Louis. But by god anyone else was fair game to Augie Busch. He wanted to win pennants.

The Cubs, meanwhile, would stick with Banks till the bitter end, till he could barely field, barely run, and had lost a lot of his batting pop. By 1971, Banks was through, but he'd been in decline much earlier. He finally retired, having failed to muscle the Cubs to a pennant despite 512 home runs and a sure ticket to the HOF. Santo, Williams, Beckert and Kessinger were never to taste the World Series bubbly either.

The Cubs at last traded Santo to the White Sox in '73 for Steve Stone. Santo had one dismal year for the Pale Hose and retired to the broadcast booth. (Maybe the move across town was too much for him.) Stone had one good year and one bad one for the Cubs, who granted him free agency-just before he had four outstanding years as the starter the Cubs had so desperately needed.

Go ahead, Cubs fans, feel sorry for yourselves about that one.

I have a hard time as a Cleveland fan feeling sorry for Cubs fans of the 1960s and 1970s. At least they were in the thick of it many times. They had bankable stars who played most of their careers with the team. The Cubs' farm system, and its bosses, simply failed to identify the elusive replacement for Brock in the outfield. Nor could they identify the two or three pitchers they actually developed who would complement Ferguson Jenkins, Hands and Holtzman in the starting rotation and out of the pen.

Had they hung on to some combination of starters Joe Niekro, Jim Colburn, Fred Norman, Larry Gura and Bill Stoneman, and reliever Lindy McDaniel (traded for Hundley and Hands in '65), who knows what might have been? In the 1960-1975 era, they were oh so close to becoming a dominant team. You can't just blame Brock/Broglio. The Cubs blew the player personnel decisions far too often.

The Dodgers and Cardinals, meanwhile, enjoyed the fruits of a more productive farm system, and they made some trades that were either sagacious or lucky. Looking at the three clubs objectively, you can only conclude that St. Louis and the Dodgers did a better job of identifying and developing talent than the Cubs. A sentimental team at heart, the Cubs could not bring themselves to part with the position players other teams truly coveted in their prime: Williams, Banks and Santo. If anything, Brock-for-Broglio made the Cubs more cautious when it came to trading valuable players. And cautious teams do not win the World Series.